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THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
TO PREEMPT CONTRARY STATE LAWS IN 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER MEDELLÍN V. TEXAS 
SHAHRZAD NOORBALOOCHI 
In 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided 
Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG after hearing the case three times.  
In the final hearing, the court held that an informal executive policy against 
the recognition of the Armenian Genocide was sufficient to preempt a 
California law that provided such formal recognition.  Scholars have criticized 
this decision on grounds that it conflicts with one of the Court’s latest holdings 
on foreign affairs preemption in Medellín v. Texas.  The extension of 
Medellín to foreign affairs preemption cases such as Movsesian III is 
inappropriate, however, because Medellín involved highly unique facts in 
three ways.  First, the executive action in Medellín inherently and radically 
conflicted with the will of Congress in that it attempted to execute a non-self-
executing treaty into law by way of an executive memorandum.  Second, 
Medellín posed the unique threat of empowering international courts over 
domestic courts, a threat that was absent in Movsesian III.  Third, Medellín 
involved the adjudication of a criminal matter, an arena in which the states 
possess a quintessential and thus preemptively more resilient interest than the 
insurance regulation matter at issue in Movsesian III. 
Because of these essential differences between Medellín and Movsesian III, 
the Ninth Circuit was correct in preempting the California law.  Furthermore, 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Movsesian III was not only consistent with 
precedent but also normatively sound.  Movsesian III’s vision of executive 
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authority, in which Congress’s will receives due deference, is more likely to produce 
rational policy choices and accord with foundational democratic values. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On Wednesday, July 30, 2014, Republicans in the House of 
Representatives voted to proceed with a lawsuit against the President 
of the United States1 on grounds that he “ha[d] circumvented the 
Congress through executive action.”2  Though a congressional lawsuit 
                                                 
 1. Paul Kane & Zachary A. Goldfarb, House Clears Way for Lawsuit Against 
Obama, WASH. POST (July 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
house-clears-way-for-lawsuit-against-obama/2014/07/30/7436aca6-1809-11e4-9349-
84d4a85be981_story.html. 
 2. Rebecca Kaplan, John Boehner Announces Plans to Sue Obama, CBS NEWS (June 
25, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-boehner-announces-plans-
to-sue-obama (quoting John Boehner on his reasoning for the lawsuit).   
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against the President is unusual,3 such bitter debates over the 
President’s power are not.4  In fact, this latest episode from the 
House of Representatives continues a heated debate that has lasted in 
American history since the Constitution’s inception.5 
This debate took on renewed national significance in the years 
leading to the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, Medellín v. Texas,6  
during which time the Bush Administration embarked upon a series 
of remarkably aggressive executive actions.7  In recent years, however, 
most scholarship on Medellín has focused on the judgment’s 
significance for the status of international obligations in United 
States courts.8  Less examined is the import of Medellín on foreign 
affairs preemption and, specifically, the power of the President to 
preempt foreign affairs-related state laws.  The limited scholarship 
                                                 
 3. See Andrew C. McCarthy, Boehner Is Bringing a Whistle to a Gunfight:  A 
Congressional Lawsuit Is Precisely the Wrong Weapon to Combat Obama’s Lawlessness, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE (June 28, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/ 
381453/boehner-bringing-whistle-gunfight-andrew-c-mccarthy (rejecting the premise 
that a congressional lawsuit will be effective in limiting President Obama’s executive 
overreach and describing alternative means for achieving such a result).  
 4. Jack Goldsmith, Suing the President for Executive Overreach, LAWFARE (June 30, 
2014, 10:48 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/suing-the-president-for-
executive-overreach (agreeing with Clinton Rossiter that allegations of executive 
overreach have plagued all memorable presidents in American history). 
 5. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961) (arguing for strong executive authority in conducting foreign relations by 
stating, “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterise [sic] the 
proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of 
any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities 
will be diminished”).  But see JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS NO. 1 (1793), 
reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 138 n.1, 147–50 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 
1906) (disagreeing with Hamilton’s views on presidential powers and stating the 
“conclusion becomes irresistible” that the Constitution did not vest legislative powers 
in the executive or executive powers in the legislature). 
 6. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 7. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER:  THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND 
THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 132–33, 314, 328, 330 (2007) (noting the 
Bush administration’s aggressive stance on presidential powers post-9/11, including 
the administration’s stance on warrantless wiretapping). 
 8. See Cindy Galway Buys, The United States Supreme Court Misses the Mark:  Towards 
Better Implementation of the United States’ International Obligations, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 
39, 68–69 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court disregarded international 
law in Medellín v. Texas and outlining the negative consequences that such 
disregard carries for American foreign relations); Eric Posner, Medellín and 
America’s Ability To Comply with International Law, SLATE (Mar. 25, 2008, 12:40 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/content/slate/blogs/convictions/2008/03/25/medellin_and
_america_s_ability_to_comply_with_international_law.html (arguing that Medellín 
signifies the United States’s evasion of international law). 
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addressing Medellín’s impact on federal foreign affairs preemption 
suggests that the case narrows the President’s authority over foreign 
affairs preemption.9 
This Comment takes the opposite view, arguing that Medellín does 
not provide a widely applicable rule for foreign affairs preemption 
cases.  To demonstrate Medellín’s limited effect on the foreign affairs 
preemption doctrine, this Comment will evaluate Movsesian v. Victoria 
Versicherung AG (Movsesian I, Movsesian II, and Movsesian III),10 a series 
of three appeals decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.  In Movsesian I, the issue was whether a non-binding executive 
policy refusing to recognize as genocide the Turkish government’s 
mass killings of Armenians in 1915–191611 preempted a California law 
providing such recognition.12  After twice reversing its decision, the 
court, sitting en banc, held that the executive policy preempted the 
California law because the California law did not concern traditional 
state powers and intruded “on the field of foreign affairs entrusted 
exclusively to the federal government.”13  This Comment argues that, 
                                                 
 9. See, e.g., Cindy Galway Buys & Grant Gorman, Movsesian v. Victoria 
Versicherung and the Scope of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power to Preempt Words, 32 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 205, 205–06, 225 (2012) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Movsesian I granted too much power to the executive and cannot be upheld based on 
Medellín); Michael D. Ramsey, International Wrongs, State Laws and Presidential Policies, 
32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19, 19, 41 (2010) (contending that Movsesian I was 
decided wrongly because the Supreme Court effectively limited the bounds of 
presidential power to preempt state laws in Medellín by limiting American Insurance 
Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), to “its facts”); Carolyn A. Pytynia, Note, 
Forgive Me, Founding Fathers for I Have Sinned:  A Reconciliation of Foreign Affairs 
Preemption After Medellín v. Texas, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1413, 1438 (2010) 
(asserting that Medellín “undermined all previous analyses of the issue” of federal 
foreign affairs preemption and limited the President’s preemption powers). 
 10. (Movsesian III), 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 
Arzoumanian v. Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 
133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013); (Movsesian II), 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670 
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener Ruckversicherungs-
Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013); (Movsesian I), 578 F.3d 
1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009), withdrawn, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670 
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener 
Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 11. See, e.g., Donald Bloxham, The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916:  Cumulative 
Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy, 181 PAST & PRESENT 141, 141–
42 (2003) (chronicling the incarceration and murder of prominent Armenians on 
April 24, 1915, the forced emigration of women and children out of Turkey into 
Syria and Iraq, and the rape, kidnap, mutilation, starvation, and murder that 
occurred along the way, culminating in the death of one million Armenians). 
 12. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1056. 
 13. Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1077. 
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contrary to what scholars have suggested, the Ninth Circuit was 
correct in its final decision because Medellín did nothing to limit the 
bounds of foreign affairs preemption. 
Part I begins by contouring the historical distribution of the 
foreign-affairs powers between the states, the President, and 
Congress.  Next, this Part outlines recent interpretations of this 
distribution of power in Medellín and the three Movsesian decisions.  
Part II argues that the Court’s judgment in Medellín does not limit the 
bounds of executive authority and therefore does not conflict with 
Movsesian III for three reasons.  First, the President’s policy in 
Movsesian III carried congressional acquiescence while the President’s 
policy in Medellín inherently conflicted with congressional intent.  
Second, Movsesian III did not involve the same shift of power from 
United States’s courts to international courts as was present in 
Medellín.  Third, the Movsesian decisions involved the adjudication of 
an insurance regulation matter, an area of law that is qualitatively 
more susceptible to preemption than the criminal law matter in 
Medellín.  Because of these essential differences, applying the Court’s 
decision in Medellín to federal foreign affairs preemption cases such 
as Movsesian III is inappropriate. 
Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit’s vision of separation of 
powers espoused in Movsesian III was not only consistent with 
precedent but also normatively correct.  The vision of power-sharing 
upheld in Movsesian III allows for cooperation and even conflict 
between the President, Congress, and the judiciary.  The presence of 
such cooperation and conflict is more apt to produce rational policy 
choices and accord with fundamental democratic values than a unitary 
model in which the President acts alone and against little pushback. 
I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S PROMINENCE OVER THE STATES IN 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF THE 
EXECUTIVE’S ROLE 
A. The Federal Government’s Primacy in Foreign Affairs 
It is an elementary truth in American constitutional law that the 
power to conduct foreign affairs rests solely with the federal 
government.14  Justice Sutherland, a Justice otherwise known for his 
                                                 
 14. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 
(14 Pet.) 540, 575–76 (1840) (“It was one of the main objects of the Constitution to 
make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation . . . .”); 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (“The 
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sensitivity to states’ rights,15 epitomized this basic assumption in 
United States v. Belmont16 when he stated, “in respect of our foreign 
relations generally, state lines disappear.  As to such purposes the 
State of New York does not exist.”17  Accordingly, when a federal law 
expresses the legislature’s intent to exclusively govern a matter 
related to foreign affairs, courts will always give primacy to the federal 
government over the states.18  However, when federal law on specific 
foreign relation matters is unclear or non-existent, it remains 
unsettled whether state law governing such matters is constitutional.19  
In this gray area, foreign affairs preemption jurisprudence has 
fluctuated between permissive and restrictive visions of the federal 
government’s power to preempt state law. 
At the permissive end sits the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs 
preemption.20  Under dormant preemption, courts preempt state 
laws that act upon foreign affairs, even in the absence of explicitly 
conflicting federal law, on grounds that the Constitution delegates 
foreign affairs matters solely to the federal government.21  If the 
courts determine that a state law negatively influences U.S. foreign 
relations with another nation, they can preempt that law even in the 
absence of an explicit federal law on the matter.22 
                                                 
States are unknown to foreign nations . . . .”); see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 149 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining that even those 
Supreme Court Justices most sympathetic to states’ rights recognized that states have 
a very limited role in foreign affairs). 
 15. See HENKIN, supra note 14, at 149 (noting that Justice Sutherland was a 
“Justice[] known for [his] sensitivity to the claims of the states in the federal system”). 
 16. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 17. Id. at 331. 
 18. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416–17 (2003) 
(acknowledging that preemption of conflicting state law by express federal laws such 
as executive agreements and treaties is “straightforward” while preemption of state 
laws containing no express preemption prevision requires further analysis to 
determine whether the state laws conflict with the federal policies); see also infra note 
33 and accompanying text. 
 19. See cf. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416–17 (noting that when there is no 
preemption clause in the federal law, the courts must infer whether the federal law 
preempts the state law by assessing the extent of its impact on foreign relations). 
 20. See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 
203–04 [hereinafter Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption] (outlining the 
different formulations of foreign affairs preemption doctrine). 
 21. Id. at 203. 
 22. Id.; see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432–36 (1968) (holding that an 
Oregon reciprocity statute unconstitutionally intruded on the national power over 
foreign affairs, even though the Oregon statute did not conflict with any specific, 
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On the restrictive end, courts have limited the federal power to 
preempt state laws to varying formulations of statutory preemption, 
whereby a state law is preempted only if it in some way conflicts with 
an express federal statute.23  Variations of such statutory foreign 
affairs preemption doctrines include express foreign affairs 
preemption, conflict foreign affairs preemption, obstacle foreign 
affairs preemption, and field foreign affairs preemption.24 
Express foreign affairs preemption occurs when a federal law 
specifically declares its intent to preclude state regulation on its 
face.25  For example, the Export Administration Act of 1979 includes 
such a preemption clause, stating that the Act preempts any state’s 
law, rule, or regulation pertaining to the “boycotts fostered or 
imposed by foreign countries against other countries.”26  Congress’s 
preemption power “flow[s] directly” from the Supremacy Clause of 
Article VI and evokes no controversial federalism questions.27  
Conflict preemption, on the other hand, requires no such express 
mention of a statute’s preemptory intent.  Under conflict 
preemption, a federal law preempts a state law if the state law renders 
compliance with the federal statute impossible.28  For example, a state 
statute may result in a consequence conflicting with the requirements 
of a federal law.29  Obstacle preemption occurs when a state law 
stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the objects and purposes of a 
                                                 
enacted federal law because adjudicating the state law forced state probate courts to 
assess and criticize other governments and posed the threat of offending other nations). 
 23. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1179 (3d ed. 2000) 
(describing the bounds of federal preemption when there is an “[a]ctual [c]onflict 
[b]etween [f]ederal and [s]tate [l]aw”). 
 24. See Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 20, at 205–07 
(outlining the various doctrines of statutory foreign affairs preemption). 
 25. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387–88 (2000) 
(recognizing and operating under the assumption of the legitimacy of express 
conflict preemption but holding that such express preemption is not required). 
 26. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-72, § 8(c), 93 Stat. 503, 524.  
The Act was passed in response to boycotts against Israel by Arab countries. 
 27. See TRIBE, supra note 23, at 1172 (explaining that though cases involving 
express preemption may raise “complex questions of statutory construction,” they do 
not invoke controversial issues on the appropriate distribution of power). 
 28. See id. at 1179–80 (describing circumstances under which “‘actual conflict’ is 
most clearly manifest,” including when federal and state law are “directly and facially 
contradictory” and when “compliance with both is a literal impossibility”). 
 29. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962) (holding that a federal Treasury 
regulation requiring that savings bond held in co-ownership pass to the surviving co-
owner upon the others’ death preempted a Texas community property law that 
would have resulted in the passing of the bonds to the deceased’s son). 
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federal statute.30  Such preemption requires that courts identify the 
federal statute’s aims and determine that the state law sufficiently 
obstructs achieving those aims.31  Finally, field preemption occurs 
when the federal government creates a regulatory scheme of such 
pervasiveness or possesses an interest so strong in regulating a matter 
that it leaves no room for state action.32 
Assessments of the normative values associated with either end of 
the spectrum have evoked strong responses.  At one end, scholars 
have cautioned that a broad reading of the power to preempt state 
laws grants too much power to the judicial branch.33  Over-reliance 
on the judiciary, they posit, “dissuade[s] the more competent 
political branches from performing [their] constitutional role[s]” of 
foreign affairs lawmaking.34  As a result, such scholars, including 
Harvard Law professor Jack Goldsmith, have argued for a minimalist 
approach to judicial enforcement.35  Goldsmith accordingly contends 
that courts should rarely go beyond utilizing express, conflict, or 
obstacle preemption and eschew preemption in cases where federal 
law is unclear or absent.36 
At the other end, a narrow conception of foreign affairs 
preemption threatens to undermine the federal government’s ability 
to speak with one voice in conducting foreign affairs and can harm 
the United States’s foreign relations with other countries.37  State 
involvement in foreign relations can undermine the national interest 
because state level actors do not bear the consequences of foreign 
policy matters and therefore do not account for these consequences 
                                                 
 30. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 1181. 
 31. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73–74 (1941) (holding that a 
Pennsylvania statute requiring aliens to register with the state and carry identification 
cards posed an obstacle to achieving the objects and purposes of the federal Alien 
Registration Act, which aimed to gather information from aliens while at the same 
time respecting their civil liberties and leaving them free from the “possibility of 
inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might . . . affect our 
international relations”); see also Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 
supra note 20, at 205–06. 
 32. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 20, at 206. 
 33. Id. at 202–03, 205, 207. 
 34. Id. at 211. 
 35. Id. at 177. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?  Federal Powers vs. “States’ 
Rights” in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (1999). 
NOORBALOOCHI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  8:01 PM 
2015] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 695 
in their decision making.38  As such, proponents of this position prefer 
that courts intervene to stop state intervention in foreign affairs.39 
The above framework establishes an outline of the historical and 
constitutional distribution of powers in foreign affairs between the 
state and federal governments.  This framework demonstrates that 
when federal law is absent or unclear on a foreign affairs matter, the 
courts have granted states varying degrees of power to implement 
their own laws.  Otherwise, however, courts have recognized and 
continuously affirmed that the power to establish foreign relations 
policies lies solely with the federal government.40 
B. The Amorphous Bounds of Executive Authority in Foreign Affairs 
The question still remains, however, as to how this largely federal 
power over foreign affairs is distributed within the federal 
government between the President and Congress.41  The Constitution 
grants only a few of the authorities commonly exercised by the 
executive today.42  These limited constitutionally granted powers 
include the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, appoint and receive ambassadors, and little else.43  However, 
by 1936, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp,44 the Supreme 
Court had come to establish that “[t]he President is the sole organ of 
the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with 
foreign nations.”45  Curtiss-Wright is one of two formative decisions in 
                                                 
 38. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1250 (1999). 
 39. Id. at 1255–58. 
 40. See HENKIN, supra note 14, at 149–50 (expressing the unquestioned principle 
that states are excluded from foreign affairs); TRIBE, supra note 23, at 656 (“The 
declaration of Article I, § 10, that ‘[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation,’ or, without congressional consent ‘lay any imposts or duties on 
imports or exports’ or ‘enter into any Agreement of Compact with . . . a foreign 
Power’ are just a few manifestations of a general constitutional principle that, 
whatever the division of foreign policy responsibility within the national government, 
all such responsibility is ultimately reposed at the national level rather than dispersed 
among the states and the localities.”). 
 41. See HENKIN, supra note 14, at 35 (surveying the progression of the President’s 
enumerated and implied powers and the surrounding historical debate). 
 42. Id. at 31 (stating that a stranger looking at the U.S. Constitution would not be 
able to discern that it is the source of today’s commonly accepted boundaries of 
presidential authority in international relations). 
 43. See id. at 31, 38 (“On the face of it, this is all the Constitution empowers the 
President to do in regard to other nations.”). 
 44. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 45. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting 
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall)). 
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the Court’s jurisprudence on the bounds of executive authority in 
foreign affairs.46  The other, demonstrating a dramatic shift in tone, is 
the Court’s seminal 1952 decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer.47  This section undertakes an analysis of these two cases and 
the normative vision that each embodies in the balance of foreign 
affairs’ powers between Congress and the President. 
In American jurisprudence, Curtiss-Wright stands as the oft-cited 
poster child for broad executive authority in international relations.48  
In Curtiss-Wright, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Joint 
Resolution passed by Congress empowering the President to declare 
illegal the provision of arms to any nation involved in the Chaco 
conflict if such a provision would prolong the conflict.49  The Curtiss-
Wright Export Corporation was charged with providing arms to 
Bolivia, a country involved in the Chaco conflict and on which the 
President had initially declared an arms embargo.50  Indicted for 
conspiring to sell weapons of war under the Joint Resolution, Curtiss-
Wright argued that the Joint Resolution was an unconstitutional 
abdication of congressional power to the President.51 
Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, emphatically 
disagreed, concluding that not only was the congressional delegation 
proper but also that the President could have acted without 
authorization from Congress in the first place.52  Though the Court 
could have decided the case on narrower grounds, it took the 
opportunity to recognize broad executive authority in foreign 
affairs.53  Finding the President to be the most suitable candidate for 
maneuvering foreign relations with other nations, the Court argued 
                                                 
 46. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:  SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 72 (1990) (juxtaposing the Court’s vision of 
executive authority in Youngstown from its vision in Curtiss-Wright). 
 47. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 48. KOH, supra note 46, at 72. 
 49. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 312, 322. 
 50. Id. at 311. 
 51. Id. at 315. 
 52. Id. at 319–20 (“It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not 
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, 
but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of 
Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be 
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.”). 
 53. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 634–35. 
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it was unwise to “requir[e] Congress . . . to lay down narrowly 
definite standards” to govern the President.54 
In its 1952 Youngstown decision, however, the Supreme Court 
limited this previous recognition of broad presidential authority.  In 
Youngstown, the Supreme Court held that the President’s unilateral 
take-over of a steel mill via an executive order was unconstitutional.55  
President Truman had ordered the takeover after the mill’s workers 
had threatened to go on strike as a result of a labor dispute with the 
mill owners.56  Fearing that a strike by the steel mill workers would 
undermine weapons production and the war efforts underway in 
Korea, Truman ordered the takeover of the mill to grant the workers’ 
requests and prevent the strike.57  In justifying this act, President 
Truman argued that the potential strike posed extreme risks to the 
country’s national security.  As such, the power to order the takeover 
of the mill to prevent such risks was within his “inherent [executive] 
power” as President and commander-in-chief.58 
This time, to the surprise of constitutional scholars and policy-
makers, the Court disagreed.59  The Court reasoned that the seizure 
of personal property was neither within the President’s powers as the 
nation’s commander-in-chief nor within the President’s authority to 
ensure that the laws were faithfully executed.60  Justice Hugo Black’s 
opinion for the majority chose a formalistic reading of the Constitution, 
wherein only Congress possessed the constitutional authority to make 
laws.61  Accordingly, the Court found that the President’s unilateral 
act was a transgression of this congressional authority.62 
                                                 
 54. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 321–22. 
 55. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583, 588–89 (1952). 
 56. Id. at 583. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 583–84. 
 59. Id. at 589; KOH, supra note 46, at 106 (explaining that by the time Youngstown 
reached the Court, most expected the Court to side with the President as all nine of 
the sitting justices had been appointed by Truman or Roosevelt, the Court “had 
swept aside past decisions that had limited the power of government, whether federal 
or state, to regulate economic and social affairs,” and Justice Jackson had himself 
authored a pro-executive decision just four years earlier (quoting WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT:  HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 64 (1987))); see also Chi. & 
S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109–10, 113–14 (1948) 
(recognizing that the Court should give deference to decisions involving presidential 
discretion and finding certain executive actions unreviewable by the Supreme Court). 
 60. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–87. 
 61. KOH, supra note 46, at 106–07. 
 62. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–87. 
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In a paradigmatic concurring opinion, Justice Jackson agreed with 
the Court but went further to establish the now-classic tripartite 
framework of executive authority.63  In the first zone of Justice 
Jackson’s tripartite framework, the President acts with the express 
consent of Congress and, therefore, receives wide latitude to exercise 
that authority.64  In this zone, an executive act is unconstitutional 
only if the federal government as a whole lacks the authority to 
govern the matter under the Constitution.65  In such cases, the Court 
would afford the President’s act the “widest latitude of judicial 
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon 
any who might attack it.”66 
In the second zone, which Justice Jackson named the “zone of 
twilight,” the President acts without a grant or denial of authority 
from Congress.67  In this circumstance, the legitimacy of the 
President’s act depends on whether both the President and 
Congress have the authority to act in that area and whether 
Congress and the President share similar policy objectives.68  
Because there exists an area in which the authority of Congress and 
the President coincide, congressional inaction would “enable, if not 
invite,” action by the President.69  Accordingly, if the President is 
acting in an area that is entrusted to the executive branch, his acts 
may deserve deference by the courts.70 
In the third zone, Justice Jackson explained, the President’s act 
directly conflicts with the implied or express will of Congress.71  Such 
presidential actions are at their “lowest ebb” of authority and subject 
to strict judicial scrutiny.72  In most cases falling within this category, 
                                                 
 63. Id. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 
491, 524, 527–28, 532 (2008) (describing Justice Jackson’s structure to determine the 
constitutionality of the President’s implied powers as the “accepted framework” for 
the Court to decide the constitutionality of domestic application of international 
commitments); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661, 669, 686 (1981) (finding 
that Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework outlined in Youngstown gathers “together as 
much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area [of executive 
power]” and was “analytically useful” when the Court evaluated and ultimately upheld 
the President’s seizure of assets linked to Iran during the hostage crisis). 
 64. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635, 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 65. Id. at 635–37. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 637. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 637–38. 
 72. Id. 
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the President must refrain from acting, modify his position, or pursue 
congressional support for his action.73  Accordingly, Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence carved out a specific place for both Congress and the 
judiciary in determining foreign affairs’ policies.74 
In his concurrence, Justice Jackson departed from the holding of 
Curtiss-Wright in two ways.  First, he rejected the Curtiss-Wright 
majority’s “[l]oose and irresponsible use of adjectives” specifically the 
use of “‘[i]nherent’ powers, ‘implied’ powers, ‘incidental’ powers, 
‘plenary’ powers, ‘war’ powers and ‘emergency’ powers.”75  Further, 
though recognizing a specific need for confidentiality and speed in 
foreign affairs, Justice Jackson minimized Curtiss-Wright’s stark 
delineation between foreign and domestic matters.76  In so doing, he 
rejected Justice Sutherland’s insinuation that the judiciary should 
defer to the President’s judgment whenever he evokes his 
commander-in-chief, executive, or “inherent emergency” powers 
from Curtiss-Wright.77 
The decisions in Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown represent the two 
prominent currents in the normative debate over the proper 
distribution of power to the President in foreign affairs.78  
Justifications for the Curtiss-Wright model give prominence to the 
structural advantages enjoyed by the executive branch for the 
conduct of foreign affairs.79  Such arguments generally claim that 
because of the executive’s unitary structure, it is more suited to 
conduct foreign relations.80  The executive is most able to identify 
threats adequately, communicate such threats clearly, respond 
                                                 
 73. KOH, supra note 46, at 109. 
 74. Id. at 109–10. 
 75. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646–47 (Jackson, J., concurring) (asserting that the 
terms lack “fixed or ascertainable meanings” and are frequently used 
interchangeably); KOH, supra note 46, at 109–10. 
 76. KOH, supra note 46, at 110. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 72–73 (describing how Curtiss-Wright comprises one dominant 
conception of executive power while Youngstown comprises the other). 
 79. See John C. Yoo, Foreign Affairs Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 46 VILL. 
L. REV. 1341, 1345–46 (2001) (arguing from Thomas Schelling’s theory of 
international relations that because the world is largely governed by anarchy, a 
successful foreign relations strategy requires a unitary “rational national actor” who 
is able to efficiently respond to international developments); see also Julian Ku & 
John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld:  The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the 
Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 180, 199–205 (2006) (arguing that 
there are strong functionalist bases for judicial deference to executive 
interpretations of laws affecting foreign affairs, especially during war time). 
 80. Yoo, supra note 79, at 1345–46. 
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swiftly, preserve secrecy when necessary, and assess the costs and 
benefits of different courses of action.81  For this reason, the 
President requires a highly centralized base of authority from which 
to successfully conduct foreign affairs.82  Accordingly, proponents of 
the Curtiss-Wright model argue against involving more parties such 
as the judiciary and Congress in the President’s foreign affairs’ 
decision making process.83 
In contrast, proponents of the Youngstown model, such as Stanford 
University Professor Alexander L. George, considered by many to be 
the greatest international relations scholar of his generation,84 point 
to the dangers of foreign policy dominance by a single person.85  
Such scholars argue that allowing the President’s decisions to go 
unchecked may enable uninformed or bad policy making.86  
Arguments for this model rely on historical mishaps such as 
Watergate, the Vietnam War, the Iran-Contra Affair, and the War on 
Terror to show that periods of expansive and unchecked presidential 
power have by and large resulted in policies that have negatively 
impacted the entire nation.87  As such, they instead argue for an 
institutional structure in which Congress is revitalized to participate 
                                                 
 81. See id. (arguing that the rational national actor must be able to act thus, and 
that in the modern world, only the President can do so). 
 82. Id.; see also Ku & Yoo, supra note 79, at 199–202 (contending that the judiciary 
is too diffuse to reach “speedy and unified interpretations” of ambiguous laws and 
that the executive branch possesses structural advantages for accomplishing this end). 
 83. See Yoo, supra note 79, at 1345 (discussing the unitary rational actor approach 
to foreign policy and noting that both realists and institutionalists assume such a 
decision making approach in nation-states). 
 84. Barbara Palmer, Alexander George, “Giant” in International Relations, Dead at 86, 
STAN. REP. (Aug. 23, 2006), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2006/august23/ 
obitgeorge-082306.html. 
 85. See generally Alexander L. George, The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making 
Foreign Policy, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 752 (1972) (highlighting the benefits that 
critical examination can have on decisions when the process is opened up to 
individuals with ideological disagreements through multiple advocacy). 
 86. See KOH, supra note 46, at 105, 112–13 (explaining that when the President 
goes to Congress and the public with a policy initiative, others can also “evaluate the 
wisdom and legality of the action”). 
 87. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 67–
85, 165 (2010) (pointing out that Watergate, the Iran-Contra Affair, and the War on 
Terror mark outbreaks of illegality from the executive branch and demonstrate the 
dangers of a “runaway presiden[cy],” which will only accelerate in the years to come 
if no action is taken); id. at 56–59 (outlining the institutional failures that paved the 
way for executive overreach that culminated in the Iran-Contra Affair). 
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in foreign policy decisions and in which the courts take an active role 
in adjudicating matters of overreach by any single branch.88 
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Medellín v. Texas 
The Supreme Court, and the nation at large, found themselves in 
the midst of exactly such controversy when Medellín v. Texas reached 
the Supreme Court in 2008.  Medellín involved a memorandum issued 
by President George W. Bush attempting to supersede a Texas court 
judgment sentencing Jose Medellín to death.89  On June 24, 1993, 
Medellín and several of his fellow gang members captured 14-year-old 
Jennifer Ertman and 16-year-old Elizabeth Peña as the girls walked 
along railroad tracks to get home.90  The girls suffered for more than 
an hour as six members of the gang took turns raping each girl.91  
Then, the men strangled Jennifer with a belt, stomping on her throat 
to make sure she had died.92  Another one of the men strangled 
Elizabeth to death with one of his shoestrings.93  That man was Jose 
Medellin, a Mexican national living in Texas. 
Approximately one year after confessing to the crime, a Texas trial 
court jury found Medellín guilty of capital murder and in a separate 
                                                 
 88. KOH, supra note 46, at 166–84 (suggesting various specific measures to restore 
balance between the three branches, including subjecting foreign policy initiatives to 
adversarial review from Congress and other departments in the executive branch, 
creating a core consultative group to monitor the output of the executive’s national 
security apparatus, enhancing Congress’s access to classified and unclassified 
information, utilizing statutory criminal penalties and even impeachment for 
instances of executive overreach and legislating the framework established by Justice 
Jackson in Youngstown). 
 89. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008); Consular and Judicial Assistance 
and Related Issues, 2005 DIGEST § 2(A)(1)(a). 
 90. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501; see also Respondent Cockrell’s Answer and Motion 
for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support at 3–5, Medellín v. Cockrell, No. Civ.A. 
H-01-4018, 2003 WL 25321243 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2002) (providing the gruesome 
details of the gang’s acts). 
 91. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501; see also Respondent Cockrell’s Answer and Motion, 
supra note 90, at 2–5. 
 92. Joint Appendix at 17, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 
2005 WL 189680 (providing the custodial statement of Medellín); Respondent 
Cockrell’s Answer and Motion, supra note 90, at 5 (reporting that Medellín stepped 
on one of the girl’s throats “because she would not die”); Allan Turner, First Execution 
Nears in Victims’ Right Case, CHRON (May 14, 2006), http://www.chron.com/news/ 
houston-texas/article/First-execution-nears-in-victims-right-case-1881082.php 
(describing that the gang members stomped on the girls’ necks “for good measure”). 
 93. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501; see also Respondent Cockrell’s Answer and Motion, 
supra note 90, at 5. 
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hearing sentenced him to death.94  Counsel for Medellín raised a 
post-conviction challenge to this sentence on the grounds that local 
law enforcement officers had failed to inform him of his right to 
contact the Mexican consulate, as granted under Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention—to which the United States was a signatory.  
Both the Texas trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected 
this challenge, finding that Medellín had failed to show that “non-
notification of the Mexican authorities impacted . . . the validity of his 
conviction or punishment.”95  Medellín then filed a habeas petition 
in the district court, which the court denied on procedural 
grounds.96  In response, Medellín filed a petition of appealability 
before the Fifth Circuit.97 
While Medellín’s case stalled there, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) pronounced judgment on Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals.98  In that case, the ICJ held that law enforcement officers in 
the United States had indeed violated the Article 36 rights of 
Medellín and fifty other Mexican nationals by failing to inform them 
of their right to contact the Mexican consulate when they were 
detained.99  The ICJ ordered that the United States review and 
reconsider Medellín’s case “by means of its own choosing.”100 
Despite this ICJ ruling, the Fifth Circuit rejected Medellín’s 
petition.101  The Fifth Circuit argued that the Vienna Convention 
provided no individually enforceable rights, and as such, the decision 
of the ICJ had no precedential authority in the United States.102  
Medellín then appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme 
Court.103  Prior to oral argument before the Court, President George 
W. Bush, fearing for the United States’s relations with Mexico, issued 
an unusual Memorandum for the U.S. Attorney General.  The 
memorandum stated that pursuant to his authority as President, the 
United States would discharge its international obligations under the 
                                                 
 94. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501; see also Respondent Cockrell’s Answer and Motion, 
supra note 90, at 4–5 (noting how additional facts were introduced during the 
punishment phase of the trial). 
 95. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501–02. 
 96. Brief for Respondent at 4, Medellín, 552 U.S. 491 (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 2428387. 
 97. Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 98. (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 72 (Mar. 31). 
 99. Id. at 71. 
 100. Id. at 73.  
 101. Medellín, 371 F.3d at 279. 
 102. Id. at 280. 
 103. Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), aff’d, 552 
U.S. 491 (2008). 
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Avena judgment and implement the ICJ’s decision.104  Based on 
President Bush’s new memorandum, Medellín’s lawyers filed a new 
post-conviction challenge in Texas courts under Texas laws.105  As a 
result of this new challenge, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal 
from the Fifth Circuit, reasoning that the case would reach the 
Supreme Court after the state court had made a decision on the new 
challenge.106  The Texas Court, acting on the new challenge, held 
that the President did not have the constitutional authority to 
enforce the ICJ’s decision via a memorandum.107  Accordingly, the 
decision reached the Supreme Court as predicted.  
Once at the Supreme Court, the Justices agreed with the Texas 
Supreme Court, holding that the President did not have the authority 
to unilaterally enforce the judgment of an international court via a 
memorandum.  Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts reasoned 
that while submission to the ICJ’s jurisdiction was obligatory because 
of the United States’s treaty obligations under the Optional Protocol 
to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), enforcing 
the ICJ’s judgment was not.  The Optional Protocol said nothing of 
ICJ decisions’ enforcement mechanisms.108  Article 94(1) of the 
United Nations Charter was the only potential source for such an 
obligation.109  The text of Article 94(1) stated, “[e]ach Member of the 
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] 
in any case to which it is a party.”110  The Court reasoned, and in fact 
the Bush memorandum agreed, that the most plausible reading of 
this language was that the United States had a “commitment . . . to take 
future action through their political branches to comply with an ICJ 
decision.”111  Because of this requirement for future action, the Court 
concluded that Article 94 of the treaty was non-self-executing.112 
                                                 
 104. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 503; Consular and Judicial Assistance and Related Issues, 
supra note 89, § 2(A)(1)(a). 
 105. See Ex parte Medellín, 206 S.W.3d 584, 585–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) 
(providing the procedural history). 
 106. Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666–67 (2005); Ex parte Medellín, 206 
S.W. at 585–86.  
 107. Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d at 348. 
 108. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 507–09; Optional Protocol Concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 
U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. 
 109. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 500. 
 110. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1). 
 111. Id. at 508 (citation omitted). 
 112. Id. 
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Then, evoking precedent, the Court reasoned that the 
“responsibility for transforming an international obligation . . . into a 
domestic law falls to Congress.”113  As the Court in Whitney v. 
Robertson114 and Foster v. Neilson115 had established, non-self-executing 
treaties could “only be enforced pursuant to legislation.”116  The 
President’s attempt to execute this non-self-executing treaty without 
such legislation conflicted with the “implicit understanding of the 
ratifying Senate” and fell within Youngstown’s third category.117 
Further, the Court found that neither its holding in Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon118 nor the text of Article 94(2) required that U.S. 
courts follow ICJ decisions.119  In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court held that a 
state court did not have to exclude evidence obtained in violation of 
Article 36 of the VCCR.120  Allowing ICJ interpretations to supersede 
state procedural rules, the Court stated, “swe[pt] too broadly” and 
could not be reconciled with the power of domestic courts to 
adjudicate cases in the United States.121 
Furthermore, the Court distinguished Medellín’s factual 
circumstances from a 2003 foreign affairs preemption case called 
American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi.122  In Garamendi, the Court held 
that the federal government’s existing scheme of adjudicating 
insurance claims arising during the Holocaust preempted California’s 
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA).123  The HVIRA 
required California insurance companies who had sold insurance 
policies in Europe during the Holocaust to disclose requested 
information regarding such policies to the California Insurance 
Commissioner or risk losing their licenses.124  Insurance companies 
and the American Insurance Association brought action against John 
                                                 
 113. Id. at 525–26. 
 114. 124 U.S. 190 (1888). 
 115. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
 116. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 526 (quoting Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194); see Foster, 27 U.S. 
at 315 (“Until such act shall be passed, the Court is not at liberty to disregard the 
existing laws on the subject.”). 
 117. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 527. 
 118. 548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
 119. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 509–10, 518. 
 120. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 349–50, 356; see also Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (stating 
that States can implement the rights provided in Article 36 “in conformity” with 
their own laws). 
 121. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 357–58. 
 122. 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 123. Id. at 401. 
 124. Id. at 401, 411–12. 
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Garamendi, the Insurance Commissioner of California, to enjoin him 
from enforcing the legislation on grounds that it conflicted with 
federal law.125  The Court found that the California statute interfered 
with the national government’s conduct of foreign relations.126  The 
federal government had already established an exclusive scheme in 
agreement with Germany for adjudicating such Holocaust-era 
claims.127  Even though this scheme did not expressly exclude state 
action, the Court held, the President’s policies were sufficiently clear 
and the California statute sufficiently impeding to this policy to 
warrant preempting California’s statute.128 
In squaring its judgment in Medellín with Garamendi, the Supreme 
Court distinguished Garamendi as a “claims-settlement case[] 
involv[ing] a narrow set of circumstances” that involved only “the 
making of executive agreements to settle civil claims between 
American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals.”129  
Because cases of this character had enjoyed a long history of 
congressional knowledge and inaction, they carried a presumption of 
congressional acquiescence.130  In contrast, preemption of a criminal 
judgment by way of a unilateral executive memorandum enjoyed no 
such history of congressional acquiescence; therefore, the Court held 
Garamendi bore no impact on Medellín’s outcome.131 
The Medellín Court then went on to assess whether the executive’s 
traditional powers to conduct foreign affairs justified the President’s 
action.132  The Court found that they did not because in addition to 
conflicting with the implicit understanding and will of Congress, it 
was a radical usurpation of state authority, as historically recognized 
and established in cases such as Engle v. Isaac.133  The memorandum, 
if enforced, would “reach[] deep into the heart of the [s]tate’s police 
powers and compel[ ] state courts to reopen final criminal judgments 
and set aside neutrally applicable state laws.”134  As such, the Court 
                                                 
 125. Id. at 412. 
 126. Id. at 420–25. 
 127. Id. at 421–25. 
 128. Id. at 420–25. 
 129. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531 (2008). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 532. 
 132. Id. at 530. 
 133. 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 532 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)). 
 134. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 532. 
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concluded, the President’s memorandum was unconstitutional and 
carried no preemptive weight.135 
D. The Ninth Circuit’s Movsesian Decisions 
One year after the Medellín judgment, the Ninth Circuit heard 
Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG.136  In a series of three appeals, 
the court assessed whether a California insurance regulation 
recognizing the Armenian Genocide conflicted with an informal 
executive policy against such recognition.137  In each of the first two 
appeals, the Ninth Circuit utilized Medellín to reach a different 
conclusion.  The first Movsesian judgment (Movsesian I), decided by a 
three-judge panel, alluded to Medellín to find that the President had 
the power to preempt the California law.138  The second utilized the 
same to find that no such power existed.139 
At issue in all three Movsesian cases was Senate Bill 1915, which 
amended the California Code of Civil Procedure to give California 
courts jurisdiction over certain claims brought by “Armenian 
Genocide victim[s].”140  The bill defined and formally recognized the 
Armenian Genocide, stating, “[t]he legislature recognizes that during 
the period from 1915 to 1923, many persons of Armenian ancestry 
residing in the historic Armenian homeland then situated in the 
Ottoman Empire were victims of massacre, torture, starvation, death 
marches, and exile.  This period is known as the Armenian 
                                                 
 135. Id. 
 136. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian I), 578 F.3d 1052 (9th 
Cir. 2009), withdrawn, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d 1067 
(9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener Ruckversicherungs-
Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 137. See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian III), 670 F.3d 1067, 
1071 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener 
Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 138. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1059–60 (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 524, to 
demonstrate that “[t]he Constitution squarely, if not solely, vests . . . powers” over 
policies concerning national security, a war in progress, and diplomatic relations with 
a foreign nation “with the Executive Branch” and therefore permits the preemption 
of the California policy). 
 139. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian II), 629 F.3d 901, 906 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 531–32, to establish that “informal presidential 
communications” have “limit[ed] preemptive effect . . . where Congress has not 
implicitly approved such authority” and therefore could not preempt the California 
policy in this case), withdrawing 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d 
1067 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener Ruckversicherungs-
Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 140. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4(b) (West 2011). 
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Genocide.”141  Three years later, Vazken Movsesian, an Armenian, 
filed a class action suit against three insurance companies, Victoria 
Versicherung AG (“Victoria”), Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG 
(“Ergo”), and Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft 
Aktiengesellschaft AGH (“Munich Re”).142  Movsesian and his class 
argued that as beneficiaries to insurance policies issued by these 
companies, he and his class were entitled to damages for the 
companies’ breach of contract.143  In response, Munich Re filed a 
motion to dismiss on the ground that an executive policy against 
recognizing the incidents occurring between 1915 and 1923 as 
genocide preempted Section 354.4.144  As such, Movsesian and his 
fellow class members could not utilize the legislation to seek damages 
from the insurance companies.145 
At trial, the district court disagreed with Munich Re and held that 
the federal policy did not preempt the California statute.146  The 
court reasoned that the matters governed by the California statute, 
such as the statute of limitations for filing claims arising from the 
Armenian Genocide, fall within a state’s traditional competence over 
procedural laws.147  Further, the court reasoned that because the 
policy had no more than a minute effect on foreign affairs, federal 
policy did not preempt the California law.148 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court, 
finding that the presence of a clear executive policy against the 
recognition of the “Armenian Genocide” preempted the California 
law.149  The court pointed to clear statements from the executive that 
urged against recognizing the Armenian Genocide and expressed 
that such action would impact negatively the United States’s national 
                                                 
 141. Id. § 354.4 cmt. a. 
 142. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1055. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1054–55. 
 146. Id. at 1055. 
 147. Id. at 1062. 
 148. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Arzoumanian v. 
Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 
(2013) (No. 12-9), 2013 WL 1945158 (“[T]here is no indication that [S]ection 
354.4(c) has had any effect, incidental or otherwise, upon United States foreign 
policy.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung 
AG, No. 2:03-cv-09407, slip op. at 33 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2007))). 
 149. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1063. 
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security, foreign relations, and war efforts.150  The court noted that 
Congress had on numerous occasions acquiesced to the wishes of 
Presidents Bush and Clinton and repeatedly stalled resolutions 
attempting to recognize the Armenian Genocide.151  Further, the 
court reasoned that the preemptive powers of the federal policy 
originated not from the classification of that policy as an executive 
agreement or otherwise but “from the source of the executive 
branch’s authority to act.”152  Because such matters of foreign policy 
fall within the executive’s sphere of power, the President’s policy was 
entitled to preemptive weight.153 
However, one year later, the Ninth Circuit reversed its decision, 
this time finding that the federal policy against recognizing the 
Armenian Genocide was not clear and therefore could not preempt 
California’s legislation.154  Starting with conflict preemption, the 
court held that because the President’s policy against recognizing the 
Armenian Genocide was neither contained in an executive 
agreement nor clearly expressed in informal documents, there could 
be no conflict preemption.155  Specifically, the court pointed to 
statements made by President Obama as a U.S. Senator, in which he 
expressed support for the recognition of the “Armenian 
Genocide.”156  The Ninth Circuit elaborated that the federal 
government knew about but had not challenged existing legislation 
in thirty-nine other states recognizing the Armenian Genocide.157  
Such inaction, the Court reasoned, evidenced the federal 
government’s ambiguity on the policy.158  The court also rejected the 
possibility of federal field preemption because it reasoned that the 
                                                 
 150. Id. at 1057–59 (inferring from a series of presidential responses to House 
Resolutions that recognizing the Armenian Genocide would complicate peace efforts 
in the region, possibly result in harm to American troops in the field, and do great 
harm to key relations with NATO allies). 
 151. Id. (referencing that House Resolutions 596, 106th Cong. (2000); 193, 108th 
Cong. (2003); and 106, 110th Cong. (2007) were never brought to a vote after the 
Executive expressed its concerns). 
 152. Id. at 1059. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian II), 629 F.3d 901 (9th 
Cir. 2010), withdrawing 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d 1067 
(9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener Ruckversicherungs-
Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 155. Id. at 905–06. 
 156. Id. at 907; see also 154 Cong. Rec. 7039 (2008) (statement of Sen. Barack Obama). 
 157. Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 907. 
 158. Id. 
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California law concerned an area of traditional state interest.159  
Citing a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg from Garamendi, the 
court placed the regulation of insurance in an area of state 
responsibility.160  The court concluded that, given the presence of this 
interest, the ambiguous expression of the presidential policy was not 
strong enough to carry preemptive weight.161 
Two years later, this time sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed its decision yet again.162  This time, it held that the 
California law intruded on the federal government’s exclusive 
power to conduct and regulate foreign affairs.163  The court held 
that although on the surface the statute concerned rules of 
procedure, its “true purpose” was to “send a political message on an 
issue of foreign affairs by providing relief and a friendly forum to a 
perceived class of foreign victims.”164  As such, the statute more than 
incidentally touched upon foreign affairs because the adjudication 
of the provision required a “highly politicized inquiry into the 
conduct of a foreign nation.”165 Because this underlying purpose 
conflicted with the federal government’s policy, the Ninth Circuit 
held the California statute unconstitutional.166 
II. MEDELLÍN’S SCOPE OF APPLICATION TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION 
CASES IS MORE LIMITED THAN RECENT SCHOLARSHIP SUGGESTS 
Despite what scholars have suggested, the Ninth Circuit correctly 
found that Medellín did not pose an obstacle to its holding in 
Movsesian III because of three essential differences between the two 
                                                 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 908 (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 434 n.1 (2003) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); see also McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 
Stat. 33 (1945).  Since the passing of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Supreme Court 
has recognized the power of the states to regulate insurance.  See Grp. Life & Health 
Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 217–18 (1979) (“The primary concern of 
Congress . . . in enacting [the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to] ensure that the States 
would continue to have the ability to tax and regulate the business of insurance.”); 
State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 452 (1962) (“[T]he 
McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . provide[s] that the regulation and taxation of insurance 
should be left to the States, without restriction by reason of the Commerce Clause.”). 
 161. Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 907. 
 162. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian III), 670 F.3d 1067, 1069–
70 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener 
Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 163. Id. at 1075. 
 164. Id. at 1075–77. 
 165. Id. at 1076. 
 166. See id. 
NOORBALOOCHI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  8:01 PM 
710 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:687 
cases.  First, in Medellín, the President’s exercise of power radically 
and inherently conflicted with the will of Congress, whereas the 
executive policy in Movsesian III had repeatedly received 
congressional acquiescence.  Second, in Medellín, enforcing the Bush 
Memorandum would have resulted in a transfer of power from 
domestic to international courts, whereas enforcing the federal policy 
in Movsesian III resulted in no such power transfer.  Finally, in 
Medellín, the President’s attempted exercise of executive authority 
encroached on the quintessential state power over criminal matters, 
whereas the executive policy in Movsesian III did not act upon an area 
of such quintessential state concern.   
A. While the President’s Policy in Medellín Conflicted with the Will of Congress, 
the Executive Policy in Movsesian III Carried Congressional Acquiescence 
In reaching the decision to disallow the President’s memorandum 
to preempt the Texas court judgment in Medellín v. Texas, the Court 
relied upon a characterization of Article 94 of the United Nations 
Charter as non-self-executing.167  As such, President Bush’s attempt to 
implement the treaty into law by way of unilateral presidential action 
was a radical departure from the fundamental constitutional 
allocation of lawmaking power to Congress.168  Legal scholars and 
courts have consistently affirmed and reaffirmed that the authority to 
pass legislation implementing a non-self-executing treaty rests with 
Congress.169  The U.S. Constitution grants general law-making power 
to Congress in the Necessary and Proper Clause,170 and since 1829, 
                                                 
 167. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008).  While it is debatable whether 
the treaty was in fact non-self-executing, a matter taken up by the dissent, id. at 542–
46 (Breyer, J., dissenting), this question is immaterial to the analysis here as 
President Bush’s memorandum operated under the assumption that the treaty was 
non-self-executing and proceeded to attempt to unilaterally enforce it even under 
this characterization. 
 168. Id. at 527 (majority opinion). 
 169. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation:  The Historical Foundations of 
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1099–1100 (2000) 
(reasoning that the Constitution unequivocally leaves the power to implement non-
self-executing treaties to Congress).  But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the 
Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1937–38 (2005) (arguing that the text and 
structure of the Treaty Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause do not establish 
that the power to execute non-self-executing treaties rests with Congress). 
 170. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make 
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
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the Court has continuously reaffirmed that this law-making power 
encompasses the power to implement non-self-executing treaties.171 
In Foster v. Neilson, the Court voiced this principle when it held that 
the “legislature” bore the responsibility of enacting laws to implement 
a non-self-executing treaty between Spain and the United States into 
enforceable provisions of U.S. law.172  Justice Marshall writing for the 
majority wrote, “when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, 
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the 
treaty addresses itself to the political . . . department; and the 
legislature must execute the contract . . . .”173  Justice Marshall’s 
opinion made clear that when a treaty is non-self-executing, it is 
Congress who holds the power to execute it.  Later, in Whitney v. 
Robertson, the Supreme Court further affirmed this principle, stating 
that “[w]hen [treaty] stipulations are not self-executing, they can only 
be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect, and such 
legislation is as much subject to modification and repeal by Congress as 
legislation upon any other subject.”174 
David Golove, one of the foremost scholars of treaty power and 
implementation in the United States, also confirms the fundamental 
nature of this principle, stating the power to pass legislation 
implementing non-self-executing treaties, like the power to pass any 
legislation to make federal law, “without doubt” lies with 
Congress.175  This principle is so rudimentary to U.S. law, Golove 
contends, that no one has ever really questioned it.176  Louis 
Henkin, Professor Emeritus at Columbia University prior to his 
passing in 2010, considered one of the most influential scholars of 
international law and foreign policy, also affirmed this 
understanding.  In his seminal book, Foreign Affairs and the United 
States Constitution, Henkin begins a section called “Congressional 
                                                 
 171. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314–15 (1829). 
 172. See id. 
 173. Id. at 314. 
 174. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
 175. Golove, supra note 169, at 1311 (“The constitutional text . . . makes . . . clear 
where authority lies for implementing non-self-executing treaties:  Congress is given 
the authority ‘[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution’ not only its own powers, but ‘all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof.’  The treaty power is without doubt such a power, and there has 
never been any question but that Congress has the power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to implement any (constitutional) treaty made by the President and 
Senate . . . .” (third alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18)). 
 176. Id. 
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Implementation” by stating, “[w]hen a treaty requires domestic 
legislation . . . only the Congress can supply them.”177 
In light of this broad consensus, President Bush’s attempt to 
implement the ICJ judgment, while acknowledging that Article 94 
was non-self-executing, was a radical departure from a core pillar of 
the American constitutional structure.  Responding to this overreach, 
the Court found that it was impossible for such action to acquire 
congressional acquiescence because it was by its very nature at odds 
with Congress’s will.178  The Medellín Court, therefore, placed the 
President’s memorandum in Youngstown’s third zone of presidential 
authority and refused compliance with its directive.179 
The characterization of the executive policy in Medellín as 
belonging in the third category of Youngstown distinguishes it from 
Movsesian III in an essential way.  Unlike Medellín, the presidential 
policy in Movsesian III received congressional acquiescence numerous 
times.  This congressional acquiescence is evidenced by Congress’s 
willingness to stall three separate House Resolutions as a direct 
response to efforts by the President.180  First, in 2000, the House of 
Representatives agreed to stall House Resolution 596 recognizing the 
Armenian Genocide after President Clinton made extensive efforts to 
halt the resolution from going to the floor.181  The resolution, which 
used the phrase “Armenian Genocide” twenty-two times, formally 
recognized the Armenian Genocide by detailing its atrocities and 
expressing the federal government’s support and sympathy for its 
victims.182  In response, President Clinton personally contacted 
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert and urged him not to bring the 
resolution to the floor.183  In his letter, President Clinton expressed 
                                                 
 177. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 204. 
 178. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527 (2008) (“When the President asserts the 
power to ‘enforce’ a non-self-executing treaty by unilaterally creating domestic law, he 
acts in conflict with the implicit understanding of the ratifying Senate. His assertion of 
authority, insofar as it is based on the pertinent non-self-executing treaties, is therefore 
within Justice Jackson’s third category, not the first or even the second.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian I), 578 F.3d 1052, 1057 
(9th Cir. 2009), withdrawn, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d 1067 
(9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener Ruckversicherungs-
Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).  These failed resolutions 
were H.R. Res. 106, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 193, 108th Cong. (2003); and 
H.R. Res. 596, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 181. H.R. Res. 596. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on a Resolution on 
Armenian Genocide, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2225–26 (Oct. 19, 2000). 
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concern that bringing the resolution would have “far-reaching 
negative consequences” for United States’s efforts in the Middle East 
and for improvement in the relations between Armenia and 
Turkey.184  As a response to these efforts, the House agreed and never 
brought the bill to a vote.185 
In 2003, the House made another attempt to give formal 
recognition to the Armenian Genocide in House Resolution 193.186  
Again, the House never brought the resolution to a vote because of 
executive efforts, this time by President George W. Bush and senior 
officials from the State Department.187  In various letters, the 
President and his officials expressed their opposition to the 
resolution, and again, the House complied.188 
In 2007, the House of Representatives brought another bill, similar 
in content to the previous two, yet again attempting to give formal 
recognition to the Armenian Genocide.189  The Bush Administration 
again expressed its disapproval of the bill, strongly urging the House 
not to bring it to a vote.190  In a letter from Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Speaker of 
House Nancy Pelosi, the Administration emphasized Turkey’s central 
role in the United States war in Iraq.191  The letter explained that 
recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the French government 
                                                 
 184. Id.  Senior administration officials such as the Secretary of Defense Bill 
Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State Barbara Larkin, and Undersecretary of Defense 
Walter B. Slocombe, as well as a bipartisan group of former national security and 
military leaders, also all sent letters to the Chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations, in which they, too, cautioned against the passing of the 
Resolution.  H.R. REP. NO. 106-933, at 14–18 (2000). 
 185. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1058 . 
 186. H.R. Res. 193, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1058. 
 187. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1058. 
 188. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Bush 
Discusses Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Legislation (Oct. 10, 2007), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/2007/10/20071010.html [hereinafter Bush Press Release]. 
 189. H.R. Res. 106, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 190. Letter from Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., and Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y 
of State, to Nancy M. Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Mar. 7, 
2007), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www. 
globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070315-gatesandrice.pdf 
[hereinafter Pelosi Letter]; see also Letter from Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., and 
Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y of State, to John A. Boehner, Minority Leader of the House 
of Representatives (Mar. 7, 2007), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_
hr/070315-gatesandrice.pdf. 
 191. Pelosi Letter, supra note 190, at 2. 
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had resulted in Turkey’s terminating military contract negotiations 
with France.192  Similar actions by Turkey towards the United States 
would threaten the United States’s war efforts in Iraq and put 
American troops at risk.193  In a press release by the White House, the 
President further asked members of Congress to oppose the 
Armenian Genocide Resolution.194  The statement cautioned that the 
passing of the Resolution would undermine United States’s relations 
with Turkey, a nation the President identified as a “key ally in NATO 
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and in the global war on 
terror.”195  Upon the issuance of these statements, the House of 
Representatives took no further action and the “Armenian Genocide 
Resolution” went no further.196 
Since 2007, the White House’s opposition to formally recognizing 
the Armenian Genocide has remained the same.  For example, the 
President’s statements on Armenian Remembrance Day in 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 never used the phrase “Armenian 
Genocide.”197  Moreover, on April 6, 2009, when a reporter asked 
President Obama whether he would support a resolution recognizing 
the Armenian Genocide in a press conference, President Obama 
specifically stated that though his stance as a Senator had not 
changed, he would not express his views on the matter because the 
Turkish and Armenian governments had made progress on their own 
in resolving the matter.198  That the President’s policy against the 
                                                 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Bush Press Release, supra note 188. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movseian I), 578 F.3d 1052, 1059 
(9th Cir. 2009), withdrawn, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d 
1067 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener Ruckversicherungs-
Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 197. Statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, 2014 DAILY COMP PRES. DOC. 
286 (Apr. 24, 2014); Statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, 2013 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 270 (Apr. 24, 2013); Statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, 2012 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 302 (Apr. 24, 2012); Statement on Armenian 
Remembrance Day, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 283 (Apr. 23, 2011); Statement 
on Armenian Remembrance Day, 1 PUB. PAPERS 537 (Apr. 24, 2010); Statement on 
Armenian Remembrance Day, 1 PUB. PAPERS 553 (Apr. 24, 2009). 
 198. The President’s News Conference with President Abdullah Gul of Turkey in 
Ankara, Turkey, 1 PUB. PAPERS 446, 448 (Apr. 6, 2009) (“I don’t want to, as the 
President of the United States, preempt any possible arrangements or 
announcements that might be made in the near future.  I just want to say that we 
are going to be a partner in working through these issues in such a way that the 
most important parties, the Turks and the Armenians, are finally coming to terms 
in a constructive way.”). 
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formal recognition of the Armenian Genocide continues to this day is 
also evidenced by express statements in an amicus curiae brief filed 
by the United States in Arzoumanian v. Munchener Ruckversicherungs-
Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG,199 in which the government argued 
against the granting of a writ of certiorari.200  There, the Solicitor 
General stated on behalf of the Executive, 
Section 354.4 does not simply intrude on foreign policy judgments 
made long ago by the United States. . . . Petitioners’ claims 
implicate difficult questions of foreign policy, and the Executive 
Branch has consistently responded to those questions by 
encouraging Turkish and Armenian officials to engage in a 
dialogue that acknowledges their shared history.  California wants 
to take a different approach . . . .201 
In light of these statements by the President and his repeated refusals 
to refer to an “Armenian Genocide,” it is clear the federal policy 
against recognizing the Armenian Genocide has remained the same. 
As outlined above, the presidential action taken in Medellín 
inherently conflicted with the will of Congress, and the 
presidential policy in Movsesian III received congressional 
acquiescence on three separate occasions.  Accordingly, Medellín is 
in the third and lowest category of presidential authority from 
Youngstown, while Movsesian III is in the second.202  Therefore, the 
President’s policies are subject to far more scrutiny in Medellín 
than they are in Movsesian III.203  In light of this essential difference, 
applying Medellín to Movsesian III is inappropriate. 
B. While Medellín Involved a Shift of Power from U.S. Courts to 
International Courts, No Such Shift Was Present in Movsesian III 
Medellín was also a highly unique case because enforcing the 
President’s policy therein would have resulted in a dramatic 
transfer of adjudicatory powers from U.S. domestic courts to 
international courts.  Warning of this threat, the majority in 
Medellín wrote, 
Medellín’s interpretation would allow ICJ judgments to override 
otherwise binding state law; there is nothing in his logic that would 
exempt contrary federal law from the same fate. . . .  And there is 
nothing to prevent the ICJ from ordering state courts to annul 
                                                 
 199. 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 200. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 148, at 16–17. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See supra notes 167–79 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
NOORBALOOCHI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2015  8:01 PM 
716 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:687 
criminal convictions and sentences, for any reason deemed 
sufficient by the ICJ.204 
The Court went on to say that “[e]ven the dissent flinches at 
reading the relevant treaties to give rise to self-executing ICJ 
judgments in all cases.”205 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sanchez-Llamas further evidences 
judicial concern about the power of international courts.206  In 
Sanchez-Llamas, the Court emphasized that Article III, Section 1 of the 
Constitution vests the authority to interpret and implement treaties as 
federal law in the Supreme Court of the United States.207  The Court 
reiterated the limits on the ICJ’s power in Medellín, stating, 
“[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its 
interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts.”208 
In fact, scholars, such as D.A. Jeremy Telman at Valparaiso 
University, have criticized Medellín on grounds that its reasoning was 
guided more by this very fear rather than any plausible reading of the 
Constitution or precedent.209  Telman argues that the decision in 
Medellín is neither supported by the Constitution’s text nor the 
Supreme Court’s recent case law.210  The drafters’ original intent in 
creating the Supremacy Clause, Telman contends, was to “empower[] 
the courts to enforce treaties at the behest of affected individuals 
without awaiting authorization from state or federal legislatures.”211  
As such, the Framers intended to create a presumption of self-
                                                 
 204. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 518 (2008). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–56 (2006) (postulating that 
because the Constitution gives the judiciary power to interpret federal laws, 
treaties—which are on par with federal law—also should be interpreted by the 
judiciary); see also Medellín, 552 U.S. at 518  (using Sanchez-Llamas to justify its 
reasoning that ICJ judgments are not “conclusive on [American] courts”); Al-Bihani 
v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting the application of the laws of 
war in U.S. domestic courts in dicta). 
 207. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 353–54.  The Court stated, “[i]f treaties are to be 
given effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning . . . ‘is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,’ headed by the ‘one 
supreme Court.’”  Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 208. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 518 (alteration in original) (quoting Sanchez-Llamas, 
548 U.S. at 354). 
 209. See D.A. Jeremy Telman, Medellín and Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377, 380–83 
(2009) (explaining that the majority opinion’s reasoning largely ignored the 
“original meaning of the Supremacy Clause”). 
 210. See id. at 414 (stating that the Court reached its conclusion “[b]ased on an 
abbreviated discussion of [early] cases and guided by relevant scholarship”). 
 211. Id. (quoting Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing 
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 696 (1995)). 
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execution, wherein treaties are assumed self-executing unless they 
expressly state otherwise.212  In finding the treaty in Medellín non-
self-executing, the Medellín Court manipulated this requirement in 
order to evade the possibility of U.S. courts submitting to an 
international legal system.213 
In the three Movsesian decisions, however, the enforcement of the 
presidential policy would not have involved such a shift of power 
from U.S. courts to international courts.  The sole issue before the 
Ninth Circuit was whether the enforcement of the executive policy 
against the recognition of the Armenian Genocide preempted a state 
policy that gave such recognition to the Armenian Genocide.  This 
decision bore no impact on the power of international courts to 
adjudicate matters that lay at the heart of state powers.  As such, 
concerns with allowing preemption to go forward in Medellín were not 
present in Movsesian III. 
C. Medellín Involved the Adjudication of a Quintessential State Interest 
While Movsesian III Did Not. 
Medellín’s application to Movsesian III is further limited because 
Medellín involved matters of criminal law while Movsesian III involved 
insurance regulation matters.214  Because criminal law is an arena 
unequivocally reserved to the states, it is qualitatively more 
resilient to preemption than the insurance regulation matters at 
issue in Movsesian III.215 
It is indisputable that criminal matters fall to state courts in U.S. 
legal jurisprudence.  The Tenth Amendment entrusts states with 
police powers to create and adjudicate almost all criminal matters.216  
                                                 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. at 415 (“[T]he Supremacy Clause was necessary to prevent the federal 
government from being embarrassed by state regulation that substantially frustrated 
the government’s ability to comply with treaty obligations.”). 
 214. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (stating that criminal 
judgments and criminal state laws are at the very heart of state police powers). 
 215. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003) (holding that the 
executive policy for handling insurance claims arising out of the Holocaust 
preempted California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HRIVA) because it 
impermissibly interfered with the President’s conduct of foreign affairs); In re 
Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113, 118, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the executive policy in favor of the resolution of Holocaust-era insurance claims 
through the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims 
(ICHEIC) preempted insurance benefits claims against Italian insurers under state 
statute and customary international law). 
 216. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (declaring that all powers not delegated to the 
federal government are reserved for the states). 
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In Engle v. Isaac, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this basic principle, 
stating, “States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing 
the criminal law.”217  In sum, Medellín appropriately characterized 
criminal law as at the heart of states’ powers.218 
Courts have recognized that the nature of the injury sustained, the 
nature of the law at issue, and the institutional structure of a legal 
system are relevant in determining whether to allow a foreign 
judgment to prevail over a domestic one.219  In Hilton v. Guyot,220 the 
Supreme Court’s paradigmatic case on the comity of nations, the 
Court stated that whether a nation will allow the laws of other nations 
to interfere with the enforcement of its own laws in its courts 
“depend[s] on the condition of the country in which the foreign law 
is sought to be enforced, the particular nature of her legislation, her 
policy, and the character of her institutions.”221  Because criminal 
matters quintessentially belong to the states in the “policy” and legal 
“institutions” of American law, courts in the United States are less 
likely to accept the contrary judgments of international courts over 
the judgments of domestic courts in this arena.222 
As the Guyot criteria suggest, the nature of the injuries sustained is 
also relevant in deciding to allow international judgments or laws to 
override domestic ones in the receiving state.223  In Medellín, the 
injuries sustained were particularly gruesome.  Medellín’s victims 
were only fourteen and sixteen years old.224  The girls were taunted, 
                                                 
 217. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). 
 218. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 532. 
 219. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–67 (1895) (outlining the factors that 
jurists have considered in deciding to allow the judgments of an international court 
to have weight in the United States’s domestic courts); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, 
AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, 
SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS §§ 23–24, 28 (8th ed. 1883) (describing how the 
structure and institutional framework of governments impact their openness to the 
judgments of non-domestic courts under the doctrine of comity). 
 220. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
 221. Id. at 164–65 (quoting STORY, supra note 219, § 28). 
 222. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006) (rejecting the 
application of the Vienna Convention even though it created judicially enforceable 
rights and allows a state to apply regular rules of procedural default); Breard v. 
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998) (per curiam) (refusing to grant habeas petition to 
Paraguayan national convicted of rape and capital murder even though he had not 
been informed of his Vienna Convention of Consular Relations (VCCR) rights). 
 223. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 224. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 501 (2008); Respondent Cockrell’s Answer 
and Motion, supra note 90, at 3–5 (providing the gruesome details of the gang’s acts). 
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gang-raped, and then gruesomely strangled to death with their own 
belt and shoelace.225  Though the persuasive force of these facts do 
not make for good precedent,226 they inevitably figure into the 
Court’s decision to disallow the enforcement of a foreign judgment 
over domestic laws and judgments.227 
Conversely, Movsesian III did not involve matters that were of such 
quintessential state interest or the enforcement of an international 
judgment.  Movsesian III involved a California law that allowed 
California courts to adjudicate insurance claims brought by victims of 
the “Armenian Genocide” and extended the statute of limitations for 
hearing such cases.  Though the Supreme Court now recognizes that 
states hold most of the power over insurance regulation,228 the history 
of the allocation of this power between the federal and state 
government has been one of tension.229 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence starting in Paul v. Virginia,230 
its subsequent overturning in United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Ass’n,231 and the final enactment of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act demonstrate the historical tension between the federal 
                                                 
 225. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501; Respondent Cockrell’s Answer and Motion, supra 
note 90, at 4–5. 
 226. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“Great cases like hard cases make bad law.  For great cases are called 
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but 
because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the 
feelings and distorts the judgment.”). 
 227. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 228. Congress passed legislation to require that the Supreme Court recognize 
state power over insurance regulations.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012) (“Congress 
hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of 
the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the 
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation 
of such business by the several States.”). 
 229. Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States:  Regulatory Federalism 
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 626 
(1999) (explaining the role of the states in regulating insurance policy and the 
power struggle between the federal and the state governments in governing 
insurance regulations). 
 230. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177, 180 (1868), overruled by United States v. S.-E. 
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as recognized in Barnett Bank of Marion 
Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1996). 
 231. 322 U.S. 533 (1944), superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 
79-15, as recognized in Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A., 517 U.S. 25. 
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and state governments.232  In the early days of the Republic, the states 
held most of the power to regulate insurance.  In Paul v. Virginia, 
the Court canonized this allocation of power by rejecting attempts 
by the insurance industry to shift the authority to regulate insurance 
to the federal government.  In Paul, the Supreme Court held, much 
to the dismay of insurance companies that wished to benefit from 
what they believed would be less aggressive federal oversight, that 
insurance regulation was a state power and did not constitute 
interstate commerce.233 
In 1944, however, the Supreme Court overturned this holding in 
South-Eastern Underwriters.234  This time, the Court held that insurance 
regulation involved interstate commerce was subject to regulation by 
the federal government and was therefore governed by the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act.235  However, signaling the tension between the federal 
and the state government, Congress overruled this holding by 
enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act one year later.236  The Act states, 
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and 
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the 
public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall 
not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or 
taxation of such business by the several States.237 
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the power to regulate insurance 
is largely restored to the states with exceptions for federal regulation 
only in areas that involve the “business of insurance.238 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently characterized states’ 
interest in insurance regulation laws as weak.239  In Garamendi, the 
Court held that California did not have a traditionally strong interest 
in adjudicating matters regarding insurance claims and that federal 
law preempted a California law requiring the disclosure of Holocaust-
era European insurance policies.240  While some have argued that the 
                                                 
 232. 15 U.S.C. § 6701; Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A., 517 U.S. at 27–28; S.-E. 
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 578–87, 592; Paul, 75 U.S. at 177, 180, 183. 
 233. Paul, 75 U.S. at 183 (finding that insurance was not a transaction of 
commerce and, thus, could not be regulated by Congress). 
 234. S.-E. Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 552–53. 
 235. Id. at 582–88. 
 236. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015. 
 237. Id. § 1011. 
 238. Id. § 1012(b). 
 239. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003). 
 240. See id. (“The express federal policy and the clear conflict raised by the state 
statute are alone enough to require state law to yield.  If any doubt about the clarity 
of the conflict remained, however, it would have to be resolved in the National 
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Court’s treatment of Garamendi in Medellín swung the pendulum back 
in favor of the states by limiting Garamendi to its own “narrow set of 
circumstances,”241 this contention is debatable for several reasons. 
First, the text of the Medellín opinion suggests that the Court relied 
upon the characterization of Garamendi as a claim-settlement case 
only because it needed to establish that the policy therein had 
enjoyed a long history of congressional acquiescence.  Justice Souter, 
writing for the majority in Garamendi, stated, 
Making executive agreements to settle claims of American 
nationals against foreign governments is a particularly 
longstanding practice, the first example being as early as 1799 . . . .  
Given the fact that the practice goes back over 200 years, and has 
received congressional acquiescence throughout its history, the 
conclusion that the President’s control of foreign relations includes 
the settlement of claims is indisputable.242 
By establishing that claims-settlement cases enjoyed 200 years of 
congressional inaction, and that Garamendi was a claims-settlement 
case, the court was able to grant Garamendi a presumption of 
congressional acquiescence.243  Under this construction, the Court 
could categorize the case under zone two of Youngstown and thus 
justify the President’s preemption therein.244 
However, the federal policy in the Movsesian cases possessed 
specific evidence of congressional acquiescence and did not depend 
on characterization as a claim-settlement case to fall into Youngstown’s 
second category.245  Therefore, regardless of whether Movsesian III is 
characterized as a claims-settlement case, there were sufficient 
grounds on which to find the presence of congressional 
acquiescence and, accordingly, preempt the California law.246  
Conversely, the federal memorandum in Medellín was intruding on 
                                                 
Government’s favor, given the weakness of the State’s interest, against the backdrop 
of traditional state legislative subject matter, in regulating disclosure of European 
Holocaust-era insurance policies in the manner of HVIRA.”). 
 241. See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 35–37. 
 242. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415 (internal quotations marks and alterations omitted). 
 243. Id. at 415–16. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian I), 578 F.3d 1052, 
1060 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that there is a clear executive policy against 
recognizing the “Armenian Genocide,” that this policy has received congressional 
“deference,” and that as such, it is “entitled to preemptive weight”), withdrawn, 629 
F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
Arzoumanian v. Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 
133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 246. See supra notes 63–69. 
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criminal law, an area that has throughout history been unequivocally 
entrusted to the states. 
In light of this congressional acquiescence and the disparity 
between California’s interest in adjudicating the subject matter 
regarding insurance claims and Texas’s quintessential interest in 
adjudicating matters of criminal law, Medellín’s extension to Movsesian 
III is inappropriate. 
III. THE YOUNGSTOWN POWER-SHARING MODEL IS MORE LIKELY TO 
YIELD RATIONAL POLICY CHOICES AND ACCORD WITH DEMOCRATIC 
VALUES THAN CURTISS-WRIGHT’S UNITARY EXECUTIVE MODEL 
The above discussion demonstrates that there are good reasons to 
accept that Movsesian III is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
formulation of foreign affairs preemption in Medellín.247  The 
question still remains, however, whether that conception of foreign 
affairs preemption is a normatively good one. 
This Part argues that the conception of power sharing captured in 
both Medellín and Movsesian III as consistent with Youngstown is good 
for several reasons.  First, the Youngstown model’s vision of 
congressional-executive cooperation carries structural advantages 
that are outweighed by the secrecy and dispatch advantages offered 
by the unitary executive model.248  Second, beyond the above 
consequentialist considerations, the Youngstown model is superior 
because it is more consistent with deontological commitments to a 
democratic model of constitutional government.249  In so far as the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Movsesian III is consistent with the 
Court’s holding in Youngstown, the Ninth Circuit espouses a sound 
conception of the executive power in foreign affairs. 
A multiple advocacy model of foreign affairs decision making, 
where various advocates from both inside and outside of the 
executive engage in structured debate over conflicting positions, is 
structurally superior to Curtiss-Wright’s unitary, rational national actor 
model.250  These structural advantages result from a realistic 
recognition of the limitations that individual cognitive abilities 
                                                 
 247. See supra Part II.A–C. 
 248. George, supra note 85, at 752 (arguing that foreign policy decision making is 
more effective when people with different opinions from outside and inside the executive 
branch participate in discussion than when there is one unitary decision maker). 
 249. KOH, supra note 46, at 212–13 (finding unpersuasive the arguments against 
congressional involvement in foreign policy). 
 250. George, supra note 85, at 752. 
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face.251  To account for these limitations, the multiple advocacy 
model includes various voices advocating for conflicting courses of 
action in foreign-policy decision making procedures.252  In so doing, 
the multiple advocacy model ensures that the Executive makes 
foreign policy choices after a careful analysis of differing perspectives 
and on the basis of complete information.253  Stanford University 
professor Alexander L. George states, in so far as 
there is significant disagreement among policy makers on . . . foreign 
policy ideology and related cognitive beliefs, . . . a more openly 
competitive system . . . is more likely to secure a critical 
examination and weighing of [such beliefs], . . . than a highly 
centralized policy-making system.254 
In an organizational framework affording “structured, balanced 
debate among policy advocates” from inside and outside the 
executive branch, foreign policy decisions are more likely to be 
rational and adequately assessed.255 
Additionally, social studies of decision making systems provide 
evidence that certain amounts of conflict over choices in a group can 
have a productive influence on the group’s problem solving abilities 
and on the quality of its choices.256  Joseph Bower, a Harvard 
University professor, argued that conflict is significant for motivating 
individuals to engage in constructive thought and analysis.257  In a 
unitary executive model, the Executive’s decision making procedures 
                                                 
 251. See Steven B. Redd & Alex Mintz, Policy Perspectives on National Security and 
Foreign Policy Decision Making, 41 POL’Y STUD. J. S11, S13 (2013) (arguing that 
“individuals face constraints that limit decision-makers’ computational 
capabilities . . . [and] memory and recall abilities”). 
 252. George, supra note 85, at 751. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 752. 
 255. Id. at 751. 
 256. See, e.g., NORMAN R.F. MAIER, PROBLEM SOLVING AND CREATIVITY:  IN 
INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS 217–18 (1970) (collating and summarizing studies assessing 
the effects of conflict in problem solving in group dynamics); L. Richard Hoffman, 
Conditions for Creative Problem Solving, 52 J. PSYCHOL. 429, 430–37, 440 (1961) 
(contending that differing opinions as to the appropriate solution from different 
group members is one condition for creative problem-solving); Victor H. Vroom et 
al., The Consequences of Social Interaction in Group Problem Solving, 4 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 77, 90, 94–95 (1969) (arguing that group evaluation of 
different solutions to a specific problem is more effective than such evaluation 
performed by a single person). 
 257. Joseph L. Bower, The Role of Conflict in Economic Decision-Making Groups:  Some 
Empirical Results, 79 Q. J. ECON. 263, 272, 276–77 (1965) (comparing unanimity versus 
majority rule procedures). 
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lack these advantages.258  When the President makes choices via self-
servient procedures that involve the input of only a few similarly 
minded individuals, the environment for critical thought and 
adversarial assessment is diminished.259  Accordingly, policy choices 
are more prone to mistake and bias.260 
Furthermore, “[a] highly centralized decision-making system . . . 
can easily overburden the top-level decision-maker.”261  Making this 
assessment in the context of President Nixon’s highly centralized 
National Security Council, George noted that fostering too much 
reliance on one cognitively limited decision maker likely weakens the 
entire system.262  Establishing a structure in which conflicting voices 
from Congress receive space for expression and influence, as the 
Youngstown model does, combats against exactly such dangers.263 
This is not to say that the multiple advocacy model is perfect.  For 
example, successful multiple advocacy often requires time-intensive 
procedures, which may place unrealistic expectations on the 
government in time-sensitive situations.264  Furthermore, employing 
the multiple advocacy model does not necessarily mean that the best 
foreign policy decisions will prevail.265  This is because the character 
and advocacy skills of a position’s advocate, in addition to the 
substantive merits of his or her position, determine whether the 
decision maker adopts the position.266  In other words, a particularly 
skilled advocate may advance an inferior foreign policy choice if the 
superior choice is less adequately presented.  Additionally, conflict 
fostered in a multiple advocacy model may also go too far and disrupt 
decision making on certain issues.267 
                                                 
 258. George, supra note 85, at 752. 
 259. See id. (arguing that a decision making environment wherein different 
ideologies openly compete is more likely to “secure a critical examination and 
weighing” of the different options than a unitary or centralized model). 
 260. Id. at 755. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See id. (asserting that there is significant risk of overloading the Executive 
without strong and competent centers cooperating from other parts of the government). 
 264. Id. at 759. 
 265. See id. at 752 (explaining that in addition to the process by which the 
executive makes decisions, other factors such as actors’ “[i]deological premises and 
cognitive beliefs about [their] opponent[s] and about the nature of the international 
system” impact the value of decisions).  
 266. See id. at 759 (describing how expertise, knowledge, and “analytical resources 
bearing on the policy issue in question” may be disparately allocated among each 
position’s different advocate and impact which position is adopted). 
 267. Id. at 785. 
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None of these criticisms, however, dismantle the multiple advocacy 
model.  All systems of decision making entail costs.268  Scholars have 
noted that though multiple advocacy may be imperfect, history has 
demonstrated that “the absence of effective multiple advocacy . . . 
can . . . have very serious costs in terms of the maladaptive policies it 
generates.”269  Historical incidents since George wrote this article in 
1972, such as the Iran-Contra Affair and the War on Terror, have 
further confirmed the fact that centralized decision making 
procedures produce detrimental policies.  The major historical 
mishaps of the last few decades have resulted not from too extensive a 
congressional involvement in foreign policy decisions but rather a too 
secretive and unitary Executive.270 
Further, beyond these consequentialist advantages, the Youngstown 
model of multiple advocacy is also superior because it represents a 
commitment to a vision of constitutional government that transcends 
the consequentialist notions of speed and secrecy.  Implicit but 
monumental in Youngstown was the premise that “certain principles 
are so central to [the American] notion[] of constitutional government 
that no president should knowingly violate them, even in the pursuit 
of the most efficient and effective foreign-policy-making mechanism.”271 
The Constitution emerged in a time of extreme trepidation 
towards the idea of a unitary authority at the head of government.272  
This historical context suggests that the Founders largely espoused a 
system more similar to the multiple advocacy model.273  During the 
American Revolution, the Founders had just revolted against a ruler 
they perceived to be a dictator who controlled the British parliament 
and exploited his power.274  In fact, so acute was their awareness of 
this tyranny that the first time they formed a government they created 
                                                 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See supra note 87 (summarizing scholarship that contends Water Gate, the 
Iran-Contra Affair, and the War on Terror were the result of overly centralized 
executive authority). 
 271. KOH, supra note 46, at 213. 
 272. SAVAGE, supra note 7, at 14–15. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See id. (describing and affirming the Founders’ fears regarding too strong an 
executive branch).  But see JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND:  THE HISTORY OF 
EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH xiv, 20–51  (2009) 
(rejecting arguments that the Framers of 1787 designed a weak presidential office 
and instead arguing that the Framers’ intended “to create a Presidency with broad, 
rather open-ended powers in . . . foreign affairs and national security”). 
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no executive in it at all.275  While they found the lack of an executive 
unsatisfactory and revised this strategy later, their awareness of the 
dangers posed by the consolidation of power in the executive was 
formative.276  As such, the Founders provided specific safeguards 
against such consolidation through a structure of checks and 
balances,277 which is most succinctly summarized in Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence in Youngstown. 
As established above, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Movsesian III 
was by and large consistent with the framework intended by the 
Founders and outlined in Youngstown.  The President’s policy against 
recognizing the Armenian Genocide had received congressional 
acquiescence on three separate occasions and therefore had received 
opportunity for congressional input.278  Taken in addition to the 
states’ historically equivocal power over insurance regulation and the 
absence of concerns over transfer of power from domestic to 
international courts, the factual circumstances in Movsesian III dictate 
towards the Ninth Circuit’s final holding to preempt the California law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Movsesian III rightly applied foreign 
affairs preemption to invalidate a California law that extended the 
statute of limitations for victims of the Armenian Genocide.  Contrary 
to what scholars have argued, Medellín did nothing to limit the 
previous bounds of the executive’s power to preempt contrary state 
laws, following precedent already established in Youngstown.  
Movsesian III, largely following that same precedent, came to the 
opposite conclusion because of three essential differences in the 
factual circumstances of the two cases. 
First, in Movsesian III, there was evidence of repeated congressional 
acquiescence to the President’s policy whereas in Medellín no such 
congressional acquiescence was present.  In Medellín, the President 
attempted to implement a non-self-executing treaty by way of a 
unilateral executive action contained in a memorandum.  Because 
the power to execute laws, including laws implementing non-self-
executing treaties, belongs quintessentially to Congress, the 
President’s act inherently conflicted with the will of Congress.  The 
presence of this conflict placed Medellín in category three of 
                                                 
 275. SAVAGE, supra note 7, at 14–15. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See supra Part II.A. 
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Youngstown.  Movsesian III on the other hand had received explicit 
congressional acquiescence on numerous occasions as evidenced by 
Congress’s willingness to halt the passing of legislation contrary to 
the President’s will.  As such, the President’s policy in Movsesian III 
belonged in the second category of Youngstown. 
Second, Movsesian III and Medellín were critically different in that 
Movsesian III involved insurance regulation, an area of law that has 
passed between the states and the federal government throughout its 
history.  In Medellín, the matter before the court involved criminal 
law, an area of law that occupies an unequivocal place in the canon of 
powers allocated to the states.  As a result, criminal laws and 
judgments tend to be qualitatively more resilient to preemption by 
informal federal policies and foreign courts’ judgments.   
Finally, Medellín and Movsesian III differed in that Movsesian III 
involved no shift of power from domestic to international courts.  
Conversely, in Medellín, enforcing the President’s memorandum 
would have transferred power over some criminal judgments to the 
ICJ, a consequence of which the judiciary is highly weary.  Because of 
these unique circumstances, Medellín’s broad application to other 
cases, including Movsesian III, is inappropriate. 
In light of this analysis, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Movsesian 
III is a normatively sound commitment to Youngstown’s balanced 
vision of separation of powers.  This model is most apt to produce 
rational policy choices by subjecting foreign policy decisions to 
critical debate.  In so doing, the Youngstown model safeguards 
against overburdening one cognitively limited executive and 
accounts for these inevitable cognitive limits by including additional 
voices.  Beyond these consequentialist advantages, the Youngstown 
model is also deontologically superior because it accords more 
closely with foundational democratic values upon which American 
constitutional law was built. 
